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ABSTRACT Social enterprise is a contested concept which has become a site for policy interven-
tion in many countries. In the UK the government has invested significant resources into social en-
terprise infrastructure, partly to increase the capacity of social enterprises to deliver or replace
public services. Government publications show the number of social enterprises to have increased
from 5,300 to 62,000 over a five-year period. This paper explores the myth of social enterprise
growth in the UK through a methodological critique of the four government data sources used to
construct and legitimise this myth. Particular attention is paid to how political decisions influence
the construction of evidence. We find that growth is mainly attributable to political decisions to
reinterpret key elements of the social enterprise definition and to include new organisational types
in sampling frames.
KEY WORDS: Critique, legitimacy, official statistics, social enterprise, social entrepreneurship
Introduction
It is relatively unproblematic to state that academic use of the labels, social
entrepreneurship and social enterprise, is increasingly common (Defourny and
Nyssens 2010, Bacq and Janssen 2011). On a related note, it is also somewhat
unproblematic to state that governments are paying increased attention to so-
cial enterprise as a policy solution to various social problems (Kerlin 2009).
But social enterprise is a contested concept whose meaning is politically, cul-
turally, historically and geographically variable (Kerlin 2009, Teasdale 2012).
While policy actions can be legitimised by the use of indicators or statistics
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(Kingdon 1984, Kendall 2000, Rehn 2008), these statistics often conceal the
social construction of empirical categories behind the veneer of scientific evi-
dence (Smagorinsky 1995). It would therefore become somewhat problematic
if academics were to unquestioningly accept claims of dramatic growth in the
number of social enterprises as truth.
The United Kingdom (UK) is seen as having the most developed institu-
tional support structure for social entrepreneurship/enterprise in the world
(Nicholls 2010a). In 2002 the Government’s Department for Trade and
Industry (DTI) set out a loose definition of social enterprise designed to
capture the wide variety of different organisational types then associated with
the label:
A social enterprise is a business with primarily social objectives, whose
surpluses are principally reinvested for that purpose in the business or in the
community, rather than being driven by the need to maximise profit for share-
holders and owners. (Department for Trade and Industry 2002, p. 8)
This definition allowed considerable scope for subsequent reinterpretation
by government as to what is and is not a social enterprise. The UK collects
some of the most detailed official statistics pertaining to social enterprise in the
world (Teasdale et al. 2011). These statistics appear to point to phenomenal
growth in social enterprises since 2003, suggesting that the UK government
policy has been highly successful (Nicholls 2010b). However the symbolic use
of evidence can promulgate myths and create meaning far beyond any intrinsic
value of the data (Brown 1994), and be used to enrol others in particular
courses of action (Latour 1987). In the UK, official statistics pointing to this
phenomenal growth have been used to justify government policies, including
restructuring of the National Health Service, and wider moves to rebalance
the welfare mix toward the private sector and social enterprises (Teasdale et al.
2012). Indeed governments from across the world have sought to learn from
the ‘successful’ UK social enterprise experience (Young 2011).
Until now academics have had no reason to doubt these official statistics,
leading some respected commentators to refer to dramatic growth in the num-
ber of social enterprises (see for example Haugh and Kitson 2007, Chell et al.
2010). But in this paper, we demonstrate (through analysis of the different
data sources used to construct the myth of social enterprise growth in the
UK) that growth can primarily be explained by political modification of the
way in which data is collected and reported. This enables the myth of social
enterprise growth to be presented as truth by political actors to further their
own ideological agendas.
The paper proceeds as follows. First we draw upon academic literature to
understand how policy makers construct and symbolically present evidence
to support their chosen policy solutions. Next we introduce the reader to the
contested concept of social enterprise, paying particular attention to the fluid-
ity of the concept across context and time. Drawing upon the UK experience
we show that social enterprise has been able to change shape to fit prevailing
114 S. Teasdale et al.
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ideologies. We explore how official statistics pertaining to social enterprise
growth have been used to legitimise political strategies, and how claims of
growth in the numbers of social enterprises have been perpetuated in academ-
ic literature. In the empirical section of the paper we methodologically cri-
tique state sponsored surveys of social enterprise. First, we show that growth
is primarily a consequence of changing the ways in which the statistics were
constructed, and political decisions to include different organisational types
as social enterprises. Second, we show that official statistics, which undermine
the social enterprise growth myth, have been concealed. In our conclusion we
return to the more general literature to argue that where concepts are con-
tested there is considerable scope for governments to select evidence to fur-
ther their own purposes. We then set out the more specific implications for
social enterprise researchers and practitioners.
The Symbolic Role of Evidence in the Policy Making Process
Policy solutions need to be considered legitimate by legislators for them to be-
come accepted (Kingdon 1984). Evidence has an important role to play in
demonstrating the pragmatic legitimacy of policy solutions. For example,
Kendall (2000), writing at a time when evidence-based policy-making was a
central tenet of New Labour political discourse in the UK, argued that an im-
portant influence in bringing the third sector to the attention of policy makers
was the new availability of a critical mass of indicators in the late 1990s.
These indicators provided pragmatic legitimacy to policy measures which
closely fitted the changing norms and values of a new government with an
expressed ideological belief in the third way – conceptualised by Giddens
(1998) as beyond market liberalism and socialism.
Evidence can also be used to confer the moral legitimacy of policy solu-
tions. As Kingdon (1984) recognises, being able to persuade policy makers
that a policy solution is ideologically correct may be crucial in convincing
legislators of its legitimacy. Using the example of Lysenkoism, Rehn (2008)
illustrates this point to hint at the dangers of academics uncritically accepting
the prevailing modes of thought in management studies. Lysenko persuaded
Soviet legislators to adopt a particular type of agricultural science by present-
ing it as based upon practical science, while constantly shaping narratives to
fit the prevailing (Soviet) language and ideology. In this he was always one
step ahead of critical academics, as before they could react to a proposition,
Lysenko had developed a new narrative (Rehn 2008). The implication then
for the policy making process is clear; ideas which are able to fit prevailing
ideologies face a greater chance of being accepted by legislators. And ideas
which are able to constantly change shape in response to a shifting ideological
environment are likely to have longevity as policy solutions.
Drawing on the early work of Goffman (1959), institutional theorists focus-
ing on the micro level of the organisation have recognised that one way of
influencing legitimacy is the use of symbols to convey meanings beyond their
intrinsic value (Zott and Huy 2007). Symbolic action can include narrative
Methodological Critique of the Social Enterprise Growth Myth 115
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accounts (Burke 1966). It can also involve the use of material symbols, such
as business plans to make a new venture appear legitimate to funders (Zott
and Huy 2007), by demonstrating that an organisation conforms to the wider
institutional norms (Zimmerman and Zeitz 2002). But symbolic action is cul-
turally contingent, and organisational (and political) actors must use symbols
that conform to the expectations of their audiences (Goffman 1959).
Just as organisational actors can use evidence symbolically to legitimise
their actions so too can policy actors. Brown (1994) demonstrates how evi-
dence can be suppressed to protect legitimacy, or manipulated to create legiti-
macy. Effectively the selective presentation of evidence is a form of symbolic
action which can be used to portray legitimacy. Evidence is socially con-
structed (Berger and Luckman 1966) and researchers are able to manipulate
findings by careful construction of empirical categories (Smagorinsky 1995).
Rather than there being a single claim to truth there are often multiple and
competing claims. So just as organisations are able to construct and present
evidence which fits their pre-determined goals (Brown 1994), policy makers
are also able to choose from a selection of counter claims, each supported by
empirical evidence (Campbell 1985). And just as organisational actors can
use evidence as symbolic proof of organisational legitimacy, policy makers
can choose, or even construct, evidence which demonstrates the legitimacy of
their policy solutions.
Social Enterprise
Social enterprise is a concept which is variably interpreted according to his-
torical, geographical, political, social, cultural and economic factors
(Diochon and Anderson 2009, Kerlin 2009, Bacq and Janssen 2011, Teasdale
2012). At its broadest level, social enterprise involves the use of market-based
strategies to achieve social goals (Kerlin 2009). What is meant by the term
social is often concealed, which hides the contestation played out between
competing factions (Parkinson and Howorth 2008, Lyon and Sepulveda
2009, Dey and Steyaert 2010).
Social enterprise has become particularly popular among academics, practi-
tioners and policy makers across the world as a potential solution to a range
of policy problems. These include, but are not limited to, a potential solution
to area-based deprivation (Blackburn and Ram 2006); an alternative vehicle
for the delivery of publicly funded services (Simmons 2008); a more effective
means of international development (Peredo and Chrisman 2006); an addi-
tional revenue raising stream for nonprofits (Dees 1998), or a potential alter-
native to winner takes all capitalism (Westall 2001, Amin et al. 2002). It is of
course unlikely that any single organisation is able to achieve all this. It would
appear that like Lysenkoism, social enterprise is an idea which is constantly
able to change shape in response to a shifting ideological environment.
This is particularly apparent in the UK where social enterprise has been
constantly reshaped by practitioners and policymakers to fit shifting social
and political environments (Teasdale 2012). Although the term had recently
116 S. Teasdale et al.
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come to prominence in the US to refer to nonprofits’ earned income strate-
gies, and in some parts of Europe to refer to co-operatives, it had not entered
common usage in the UK before the late 1990s. A loose alliance of influential
practitioners from the co-operative and community development movements,
sympathetic Labour politicians, and members of left leaning think tanks
adopted the concept of social enterprise as part of an ideological aim to radi-
cally change the ways of organising markets (Westall 2001, Grenier 2009,
Ridley-Duff and Bull 2011). To attract further political support they pre-
sented social enterprise as an organisational form of the third way and as a so-
lution to the policy problem of area-based deprivation (Grenier 2009,
Teasdale 2012).
The concept was eagerly taken on board by a Labour government, ideologi-
cally committed to a third way beyond state socialism and free market capi-
talism. In 1999, social enterprise was first presented as a response to area-
based deprivation (HM Treasury 1999, Blackburn and Ram 2006). Between
1999 and 2001, social enterprise (also) became seen as a solution to the failure
of markets to distribute goods and services equitably (Teasdale 2012). By
2002, social enterprise was (additionally) portrayed as a policy solution to the
failure of the state to deliver public services that were responsive to consumers
(Simmons 2008). In 2006, social enterprise became presented as a solution to
the failure of the third sector to scale-up (Office of the Third Sector 2006).
Since 2008, social enterprise has been particularly emphasised as a vehicle
through which public services can be spun-off allowing greater democratic
ownership and control (Blond 2009). Each extension of the concept has in-
volved re-articulation through drawing on different claims and evidence. At
different times and across different contexts, policy actors have repackaged
elements from different narratives to bolster their own legitimacy. For exam-
ple, when legitimising the use of social enterprises to deliver public services,
they were presented as: innovative and entrepreneurial, enabling access to
public services and improving outcomes for the hardest to help (Office of the
Third Sector 2009). This was rather different to the emphasis in 1999 on social
enterprises’ (supposed) ability to build social capital through democratic en-
gagement and hence contribute to neighbourhood renewal (HM Treasury
1999). So the fluidity of the concept permits considerable scope to select posi-
tive attributes in order to legitimise policy action.
The Myth of Social Enterprise Growth
The first government-sponsored estimate of the number of social enterprises
in the UK, published in 2003, estimated a total of 5,300 (ECOTEC 2003). A
mapping study undertaken for the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)
in 2004 estimated there were 15,000 social enterprises in the UK (IFF Re-
search 2005), although the methodology was described in The Economist as
‘slightly alarming’ by an ‘expert’ rumoured to be the editor of this journal
(The Economist, 24th November 2005). By 2005, the Annual Survey of Small
Businesses (ASBS) was used to claim there were ‘at least’ 55,000 social
Methodological Critique of the Social Enterprise Growth Myth 117
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enterprises in the UK, leading commentators relying on this data to claim
that ‘a new characteristic of the third sector under New Labour has been the in-
crease in the number of social enterprises’ (Haugh and Kitson 2007, p. 975). In
2008, official government publications based on the 2007 ASBS revised this
to an estimated 62,000 social enterprises.
The statistics showing growth in social enterprise are regularly used in
government publications, often combined with narratives of heroic success
and a list of positive attributes (see for example, Cabinet Office 2006, the
Government’s Social Enterprise Action Plan). The apparent growth from
55,000 to 62,000 social enterprises led to a Cabinet Office spokeswoman
stating that:
We do believe that the number of social enterprises is increasing and therefore
this new estimate is consistent with feedback from our partners that the sector
is growing, which is great news. (cited in Hampson 2009)
The same spokeswoman symbolically managed the myth of social enter-
prise growth by associating the statistics to other public bodies to portray
legitimacy.
We have strengthened the methodology following advice from the Office of
National Statistics. (Hampson 2009)
The statistics are regularly used by politicians and practitioners to legitimise
their past and future actions, even where the relevance of the figure to the argu-
ment being made is not obvious. For example, in 2010, the Secretary of State
for Health referred to the 62,000 social enterprises when announcing plans to
‘create the largest and most vibrant biggest social enterprise sector in the world’
through empowering ‘millions of public sector workers to become their own boss
and help[ing] them to deliver better services’ (Department of Health 2010).
These estimates have been widely cited not just in policy and practitioner lit-
erature, but also academic publications (including, but not limited to: Haugh
and Kitson 2007, Spear et al. 2009, Bridgstock et al. 2010, Mawson 2010),
and the myth of social enterprise growth has been presented as absolute fact:
In the UK, social enterprises have undergone high growth rates with high levels
of success in pursuit of their aims. (Chell et al. 2010, p. 486)
It is perhaps surprising that the UK government estimates of 62,000 social
enterprises have been so widely accepted given that academics and policy
makers have not been able to agree upon a common definition of social enter-
prise (Peattie and Morley 2008). However in previous articles the authors of
this paper have also used these government figures. Our own (self) critical
reflections suggest that just as practitioners and policy makers have used
the statistics to legitimise their actions, so have academics sought to legitimise
the field of social enterprise research by symbolically highlighting its
118 S. Teasdale et al.
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importance using evidence [1]. Put simply, we all need to demonstrate that our
area of research is important when seeking to win research grants or to
publish in high quality journals. Perhaps now that the field of social enterprise
research has become relatively well-established, it is time to take a step
backwards and explore the methodological foundations upon which our
claims of growth are constructed.
The Political Construction of a Social Enterprise Growth Myth
As discussed earlier, social enterprise first entered the UK policy landscape
in the late 1990s. In 1999, the Neighbourhood Renewal Unit produced
Enterprise and Exclusion which drew upon narrative profiles of successful
social enterprises to claim that:
Social enterprises can make a positive contribution to the regeneration of
deprived areas by helping to provide employment, goods, services and more
generally build social capital. (HM Treasury 1999, p. 112)
A number of policy measures aimed at developing social enterprise activity
were announced, and an indicator of the success of government policy was to
be the level of social enterprise activity (HM Treasury 1999).
Following concerted lobbying by the social enterprise movement, a Social
Enterprise Unit was established within the then Department for Trade and
Industry (DTI) in 2001 (Grenier 2009, Bland 2010). The Secretary of State
for Trade and Industry, Patricia Hewitt, hosted a social enterprise seminar at
which an ‘immediate need’ for ‘better data’ and ‘more mapping of the sector’ if
the ‘potential of social enterprise’ was to be realised (Kenyon and Crellin
2001). Consequentially a social enterprise mapping working group involving
civil servants, high profile practitioners and academics was created to pursue
this need. This led to the government definition of social enterprise repro-
duced again here:
A social enterprise is a business with primarily social objectives, whose
surpluses are principally reinvested for that purpose in the business or in the
community, rather than being driven by the need to maximise profit for share-
holders and owners. (Department for Trade and Industry 2002, p. 8)
Three elements are crucial to this definition:
1. First, ‘a business’ implies that social enterprises are different to tradi-
tional charities as they trade in the marketplace.
2. Second, ‘primarily social objectives’ distinguish social enterprises from
traditional businesses.
3. Third, ‘surpluses are principally reinvested ’ (to meet their social objec-
tives) rather than ‘being driven by the need to maximise profits for share-
holders and owners’.
Methodological Critique of the Social Enterprise Growth Myth 119
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Over the next decade, four state-sponsored studies operationalised this defi-
nition as an empirical category in order to produce statistics pertaining to so-
cial enterprise scale and growth (see Table 1).
In the following sections we methodologically critique these studies, in turn,
paying particular attention to political contestation over how to construct the
empirical category of social enterprise and how the decisions taken have influ-
enced evidence on the growth of social enterprise in the UK. We show that
the social enterprise growth myth can be almost wholly explained by shifting
interpretations of the key elements of the social enterprise definition, and re-
lated decisions as to which types of organisation make up the population
from which social enterprises are drawn.
2003: Up to 5,300 Social Enterprises? Guidance on Mapping Social Enterprises
In 2003, the DTI commissioned ECOTEC, an economic development consul-
tancy, to examine how different mapping exercises had been carried out; to
determine whether the DTI definition of social enterprise could be retrospec-
tively applied to these surveys; and to provide guidance as to how to opera-
tionalise the DTI definition for future surveys.
ECOTEC analysed 33 small-scale regional studies undertaken between
1999 and 2003. The studies used different approaches to collecting data, rang-
ing from ‘top-down’ analysis of publicly available data from the Financial
Services Authority to ‘bottom-up’ approaches approximating to snowball
sampling. Definitions of social enterprise varied, although most studies re-
quired core criteria of: more than 50% of income from trading; explicit social
aims; and social ownership defined by ECOTEC as:
Autonomous organisations with a governance and ownership structure based
on participation by stakeholder groups (users or clients, local community
groups, etc.) or by trustees. Profits are distributed as profit sharing to stake-
holders or used for the benefit of the community. (ECOTEC 2003, p. 25)
A ‘guesstimate’ of the number of social enterprises in the UK was derived
from those existing studies which adopted ‘defining characteristics’ of a 50%
trading level, and enabled a comparison with the wider business population.
The proportion of social enterprises in the wider business population ranged
between 0.2 and 0.3% in these studies. Applying this ratio to the population
of businesses in the UK provided a total ‘of up to 5,300’ (ECOTEC 2003).
Guidance for future mapping studies included developing ‘tests’ based on
the DTI definition. Social enterprises should be formally registered to imply a
degree of permanence. They should derive at least 50% of income through
trading. A test that identifies whether an organisation has primarily social
objectives and whether in pursuit of these objectives it principally reinvests
surpluses in the business or in the community was also recommended. Ideally
future work would identify this key element through examining legal forms
and memorandums of association to ensure that core values are embedded in
120 S. Teasdale et al.
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the legal constitution. However this was recognised as time consuming. As a
consequence it was recommended that a first national mapping study should
focus on Industrial and Provident Societies and Companies Limited by
Guarantee (CLG). In addition to these constituting the large majority of
social enterprises captured in existing studies, these legal forms guaranteed
social ownership [2].
2004: 15,000 Social Enterprises? A Survey of Social Enterprises Across the UK
In 2004, the DTI commissioned IFF Research to conduct a mapping exercise
of social enterprises in the UK. In this survey an organisation was considered
a social enterprise if:
1. regular activities involve providing products or services in return for
payment – i.e. the enterprise has some form of trading activity
2. at least 25 per cent of funding is generated from trading – i.e. through
direct monetary exchange for the provision of goods and services
3. the primary purpose is to provide social/environmental goals – i.e. rath-
er than purely for profit
4. they principally reinvest profit/surplus into the organisation or commu-
nity to further social/environmental goals – i.e. at least 51 per cent of
profit/surplus (IFF Research 2005, p. 7–8).
Including all those organisations with more than 25% trading income
(instead of 50%) was ostensibly to capture newer social enterprises moving to-
wards a 50% trading threshold (IFF Research 2005). That the revised
approach might also capture organisations moving in the opposite directions
as well as those which would never achieve a 50% trading threshold was seem-
ingly not considered. Of course it should not be overlooked that a higher esti-
mate of the social enterprise population would legitimise the government’s
large investment in the social enterprise support infrastructure, and more gen-
eral commitment to develop the social enterprise sector (DTI 2002).
The sampling approach followed the ECOTEC guidance by focusing on
CLG, a large proportion of which were also charities, and Industrial and
Provident Society (IPS), a legal form commonly used by cooperatives. From
a sample frame of 62,500 organisations, 8,401 were interviewed and 3,446 of
these were identified as social enterprises. The survey was used to provide an
estimate of around 15,000 social enterprises or 1.2% of all enterprises in the
UK. It was estimated that they contributed £18 billion to GDP, and
employed 475,000 paid staff, of whom two-thirds were full time.
Much of the apparent increase in the number of social enterprises from the
earlier study is likely to be explained by the loosening of the trading threshold
from 50 to 25%. Also, it should be remembered that the earlier study general-
ised from studies undertaken prior to 2003, some of which had included
democratic participation as a defining criteria of social enterprise (ECOTEC
2003).
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2007: 62,000 Social Enterprises? The Annual Small Business Surveys (ASBS)
In 2004/05, the DTI added questions to the long-running Annual Small Busi-
ness Surveys in order to estimate what proportion of mainstream businesses
were social enterprises. This approach had been recommended by ECOTEC
in order to capture social businesses and charities with a Company Limited
by Share legal form, and the new legal form of Community Interest Company
(ECOTEC 2003). The survey was conducted by IFF Research with academic
input in the analysis and reporting (Atkinson et al. 2006).
The survey used a self-classification system for social enterprises. For a
business to be classified as a social enterprise they should:
1. think of themselves as a social enterprise (Q37 in the 2006/07 survey)
2. not pay more than 50 per cent of profits to owners/shareholders (Q36)
3. generate more than 25 per cent of income from traded goods/services
(Q34A)
4. think that they are a very good fit with the DTI definition (Q38) (IFF
Research 2008).
Whereas the previous survey had only sampled organisations with explicit
social ownership, this survey included all registered businesses whatever their
legal form. Rather than attempt to ensure that private businesses had a con-
stitution which committed them to social aims and the reinvestment of sur-
plus to meet those aims, the ASBS survey relied on respondents to answer
test questions designed to ensure this criteria. However the test questions
were also changed from the previous survey.
In the earlier IFF survey, respondents were explicitly asked if their organisa-
tion reinvested the majority of surplus for social or environmental purpose
(IFF Research 2005). In the ASBS survey, the test question was modified such
that organisations defined as social enterprises do not pay more than 50% of
profits to owners/shareholders. Of course most businesses rarely pay more
than 50% of profits as dividends. According to the ASBS data, only 18% of all
SMEs paid more than 50% of profits to owners/shareholders in 2007.
To determine whether organisations’ objectives were primarily social,
respondents were asked if they were a close fit with the DTI definition. This
differs from the previous (IFF Research) survey which explicitly asked wheth-
er organisational objectives were to pursue a social (including environmental)
goal (OR) to make profit for owners, partners and shareholders.
The data presented from the ASBS surveys has previously been superficial,
providing a single overall published figure of a minimum of 55,000 social
enterprises, rising in 2009 to a minimum of 62,000, based on a three year roll-
ing average for 2005–07 (Hampson 2009).
Closer analysis of the 2006/07 survey data (see Table 2) yields the key find-
ing that the overwhelming majority (89%) of the 151 organisations identified
as social enterprises have a legal form that places no constraints on the distri-
bution of profits to external shareholders (Companies Limited by Share,
Partnerships or Sole Traders). Thus, these organisations would not have been
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considered social enterprises in the earlier surveys. The proportion of private,
for personal profit enterprises included in the mythical figure of 62,000 social
enterprises had not been disclosed prior to the analysis in this paper.
A further political decision was made concerning the exclusion of the large
number of enterprises (predominantly sole traders) not employing people but
meeting the social enterprise tests. Including all respondents who met the test
would increase the number of social enterprises to 234,000. This figure is
notable by its absence in publications or policy documents. We suggest this
figure was so far removed from earlier estimates that the legitimacy of the
data would be questioned, if published.
The apparent growth from 15,000 social enterprises is more than explained
by the political decision to include all businesses in the sampling frame. In the
2006/07 ASBS, only 0.7% of respondents were identified as social enterprises
and had a legal structure implying social ownership and constraints on profit
distribution. This analysis suggests that if private enterprises with the poten-
tial to distribute profit to shareholders were excluded, there would only be
8,000 social enterprises. To some extent this decision reflected wider political
contestation around the social enterprise context. The survey was designed at
a time when more commercially orientated social enterprises had significant
influence within the DTI and prominent practitioners argued that it was
acceptable to create private profit through social enterprise (Teasdale 2012).
The dramatic growth from 15,000 to 55,000 can largely be attributed to po-
litical decisions to count private for profit businesses as social enterprises
then. However the growth from 55,000 to 62,000 between 2005 and 2007
requires further consideration. This increase might perceivably have been
explained by an increase in newly registered organisations identifying as
social enterprises. However closer analysis of the ASBS data reveals that only
5.3% of the social enterprises in the 2007 survey had been trading for three
Table 2. Legal status by social enterprise (Annual Small Business Survey 2006/07)
All SEs
(0–250 employees)
SEs with 1 or
more paid employees
All small and
medium enterprises
No. % No. % No. %
Sole Proprietorship 262 56.1 49 32.4 4363 46.6
Private Limited Company 93 19.9 63 41.7 3172 33.9
Public Limited Company 9 1.9 2 1.3 40 0.4
Limited Partnership 1 0.2 1 0.7 33 0.4
Partnership 82 17.6 19 12.6 1682 17.9
Cooperative 0 0 0 0 11 0.1
Company Limited by
Guarantee (CLG)
14 3 14 9.3 41 0.4
Friendly Society (FS) 2 0.4 2 1.3 6 0.06
Community Interest
Company (CIC)
4 0.9 1 0.7 4 0.04
Total 467 100 151 100 9362 100
Source: ASBS 2007 (weighted). Categories in bold usually associated with the ‘Third Sector’.
Includes Community Benefit Societies.
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years or less. The growth therefore is more likely to be a consequence of a
higher proportion of existing businesses claiming to be a good fit with the
DTI definition of social enterprise. However the data are unable to tell us
what extent this represents a change in behaviour of these businesses or a
generalised perception that being identified as a social enterprise is socially
desirable/morally legitimate.
2009: 8,507 Social Enterprises? The National Survey of Third
Sector Organisations
While the figure of 62,000 social enterprises is widely quoted, a later study
of organisations with explicit social ownership [The National Survey of
Third Sector Organisations (NSTSO)] found only 8,507. This survey was
commissioned by the Cabinet Office and was carried out by Ipsos MORI
over 2008–09. To be defined as a social enterprise, an organisation had to
self-identify as:
1. Generating more than 50% of income from trading (i.e. the sale of
goods and services);
2. Reinvesting surplus to further social and environmental aims;
3. Being a close fit with the DTI definition.
The sample frame of 170,552 Third Sector Organisations (TSOs) was con-
structed by Guidestar UK, and included registered charities, CLGs, IPSs and
CICs (Ipsos MORI 2009). Companies Limited by Share would only be in-
cluded if they were trading subsidiaries of registered charities. Thus, the sam-
ple frame considered exclusively of organisations which were legally obliged
to have ‘primarily social objectives’ and restrictions on the ‘reinvestment of sur-
plus’ embedded in their constitution. From this sample, a postal and a web
survey were sent to 104,931 organisations with a response rate of 47%.
Analysis using Ipsos MORI’s narrow definition of social enterprise, derived
using all the above criteria, produces an estimate that 5% of TSOs can be clas-
sified as social enterprises, a total of 8,507 nationally. The question on rein-
vesting surplus was perhaps irrelevant, given that the sampling criteria were
designed to capture only organisations which reinvested all surpluses in the
organisation or to pursue social goals. However this question led to the 35%
of organisations making a loss not being considered as social enterprises.
When excluding this question on reinvesting, the number of organisations
meeting the other tests is shown to be 16,361 (see Table 3), a number not dis-
similar to the estimate of 15,000 social enterprises from 2004. The NSTSO
dataset is deposited in the UK Data Archive but the estimate of the number
of social enterprises has not been reported by the government, arguably be-
cause it does not support the myth of social enterprise growth.
Of course the main reason for the apparent decline in the number of social
enterprises was the decision to sample only third sector organisations, which
by definition had explicit social ownership. But this could not easily be
Methodological Critique of the Social Enterprise Growth Myth 125
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 B
irm
ing
ha
m]
 at
 07
:55
 14
 M
ay
 20
14
 
explained by the government. The survey was undertaken during a period
when the Labour government was heavily promoting the third sector as a site
for policy intervention, particularly as a means of delivering public services
(Carmel and Harlock 2008, Di Domenico et al. 2009). As part of this process,
departmental responsibility for social enterprise had shifted from the DTI
to the new Cabinet Office of the Third Sector (OTS). The government
claimed that:
social enterprises are part of the ‘third sector’, which encompasses all organisa-
tions which are nongovernmental, principally reinvest surpluses in the commu-
nity or organisation and seek to deliver social or environmental benefits. (OTS
2006, p. 10)
If this were true, then how might the government explain that the phenome-
nal growth in social enterprises was a consequence of the inclusion of organi-
sations not considered part of the third sector? It would appear that
protecting legitimacy was to be achieved by the careful suppression of
evidence.
Conclusion
Our methodological critique of the four government-sponsored surveys ena-
bles us to understand how the myth of social enterprise growth has been em-
pirically constructed. All of the state sponsored surveys have attempted to
estimate the numbers of organisations meeting the social enterprise definition,
first specified by the DTI. While this definition has not changed, interpreta-
tion of the three key elements within it has altered dramatically. The first
study undertaken by ECOTEC (2003) involved estimating from existing sur-
veys what proportion of democratically controlled organisations, with restric-
tions on the distribution of surplus, derived at least half their income through
trading. In the second study undertaken by IFF Research (2005), the criteria
as to what constitutes a business was widened from achieving 50% to just
Table 3. Analysis of 2008/09 National Survey of Third Sector Organisations questions
related to social enterprise
Percent of sample Estimate of population
Involved in some trading activity 27.6 47,072
Have more than 50% of income from trading 12.5 21,344
Stated that they fit the social enterprise definition 48.1 82,046
Agree with definition and have more than 50% of
income from trading
9.6 16,361
More than 50% trading, fit the social enterprise
definition and use more than 50% of surplus for
social and environmental goals
5.0 8,507
Source: NSTSO 2009, unweighted responses ¼ 48,939.
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25% of income through trading. The apparently dramatic growth in social
enterprises between 2004 and 2005 can be explained by changes to how the
key element of ‘primarily social objectives’ was interpreted, from an emphasis
on governance and ownership structures based on democratic participation
to allowing respondents to decide whether they are a close fit with the DTI
definition. At the same time, and perhaps crucially, the ‘reinvestment of sur-
plus’ element has moved from a strict emphasis on surpluses only being dis-
tributed as stakeholder profit sharing (as followed by co-ops and mutuals) or
used for the explicit benefit of the community, to not using more than 50% of
surplus for personal profit. The reinterpretation of these elements allowed pri-
vate businesses to be classified as social enterprises such that almost 90% of
the mythical 62,000 social enterprises are organisations which would not have
been considered social enterprises under the original interpretation of the def-
inition. The most recent NSTSO allows an approximation as to how many so-
cial enterprises there are in the UK, meeting the 2004 interpretation of the
definition. Our analysis suggests around 16,000 TSOs would be considered
social enterprises using this approach. Counting for-profit organisations as
social enterprises seemingly accounts for almost all of the apparent growth
between 2003 and 2007.
Organisational actors can use evidence as symbolic proof of organisational
legitimacy. Evidence can also be symbolically managed to legitimise policy ac-
tion. Where policy decisions are made for ideological reasons, evidence which
confers pragmatic legitimacy on these decisions can be a particularly powerful
tool. For example, evidence showing productivity growth or declining unem-
ployment is often used to highlight the success (or failure) of government ini-
tiatives. Scientific evidence has a symbolic value far beyond the intrinsic value
of the data which conceals the social construction of empirical categories.
This enables policy makers to construct evidence and use it to legitimise their
actions through selective presentation. But while decisions made as how to
construct Gross Domestic Product or unemployment statistics are highly po-
litical, (relative) consensus as to what is meant by unemployment or national
output place limits on the scope for political manipulation. To some extent it
may be that this is because unemployment and recession are policy problems.
However like Lysenkoism, social enterprise is a policy solution which perhaps
makes it easier to redefine according to prevailing ideologies. The wider con-
tribution of this paper has been to show that where a policy solution such as
social enterprise is highly contested, governments have more scope to select
those aspects which fit its own ideological agenda and provide legitimacy to
policy actions.
A wide range of organisational types lays claim to the social enterprise con-
cept. Each has its own compelling stories to tell. This has enabled govern-
ments to selectively draw attributes from competing myths in order to create
a loose policy construct of social enterprise. Concealing ideological underpin-
nings of pervasive belief in market based systems, and a desire to reduce the
direct state provision of public services, this policy solution shifts over time
and can seemingly be adapted to fit wider social and political contexts and re-
spond to pressing social problems as they arise.
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One myth accepted by most protagonists is that of social enterprise growth.
It is here that those attempting to promote social enterprise as a policy solu-
tion want to show the increasing importance of social enterprise to bolster
their own legitimacy, and as academics we are not immune from this. In par-
ticular the myth of social enterprise growth has enabled policy makers to lay
claim to the success of their policies and to justify future policy action using
social enterprise. But as this paper has shown, the myth of social enterprise
growth can primarily be explained by political decisions to reinterpret key ele-
ments of the concept in response to shifting ideologies.
Even where growth has been measured using the same (ASBS) survey, this
is not a consequence of new organisations being formed as social enterprises,
but rather existing organisations claiming to meet the social enterprise defini-
tion. We would argue that as the language of social enterprise (and the DTI
definition) has infiltrated popular discourse, more individuals are aware of
the social desirability or normative legitimacy attached to self-identifying
with this definition. Whether this growth reflects any real change in organisa-
tional behaviour is far from clear.
So the myth of social enterprise growth has been constructed through gov-
ernments being able to manipulate survey methods, and to selectively present
evidence supporting the myth while concealing contradictory evidence. The
widely referred to figure of 62,000 social enterprises does not accurately repre-
sent the types of (socially owned) organisations which government policy is
aimed at. Despite being aware of this, governments have used the 62,000
figure to justify the success of their policy measures. So just as organisations
use evidence symbolically to portray legitimacy (Brown 1994), governments
can manipulate perceptions through the selection of data collection tools and
reporting strategies. This would seem a form of symbolic action, used to legit-
imate policy measures driven by ideology, particularly pertaining to the en-
couragement of TSOs to adopt more sustainable (market-orientated) funding
mechanisms and to become involved in the delivery of public services.
Our study has direct implications for practitioners and researchers. For en-
trepreneurship research, there is a need to go beyond accepting that defini-
tions can change over time due to political influence, and to recognise that
evidence is a social construct. Research that explores the creation of such sta-
tistics rather than taking them as a singular truth is needed. For practice and
policy actors there is a common need to challenge evidence based on loose
definitions, and for those using such data, to be explicit on what they are col-
lecting, what they are presenting and what they are excluding. With respect to
social enterprise, this paper shows that understanding the concept is not pos-
sible without understanding how myths are constructed and how such myths
influence (or are influenced by) ideologies in policy and practice.
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Notes
1. See Nicholls (2010b) for an excellent account of the legitimization of the social entrepreneurship field
by different institutional actors.
2. For an overview of the different legal forms adopted by social enterprises in the UK see Smith and
Teasdale (2012).
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